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family disputes" is emblematic of the fiercely-protected privacy shield
around issues regarding the family in many East Asian jurisdictions. State
reluctance to interfere in the family arguably stems from Confucian social
norms that prioritize the patriarchal family unit at the expense of the
individual, oftentimes in conflict with international human rights
The historic Jessica Lenahan
obligations of East Asian countries.
(Gonzales) v. United States' decision by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) affirms states' obligations to exercise due
diligence to combat domestic violence in all aspects, thereby specifically
undergirding state responsibility to create and enforce a coordinated
The Lenahan
response to domestic violence across state agencies.
decision's explicit framing of domestic violence as: (1) a human rights
issue, (2) a gender discrimination issue, and (3) an issue of state
responsibility has several important implications for how East Asian
countries should effectuate their obligations under international law to
protect individuals from domestic violence.
This Article critically considers the meaning and ideology of the
"Confucian" family and argues that it has impacted human rights and antidomestic violence initiatives in East Asian jurisdictions on two levels.
First, Confucian culture and social norms have been used as the ideological
underpinning of state claims against universalist interpretations of human
rights.2 Although all the East Asian jurisdictions examined are parties to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), their governments have interpreted the scope of
women's rights to be subject to each State's particular cultural and
historical circumstances, as indicated by State Party reservations to
CEDAW and state practices in the international arena. This Article will
examine how government policies and legislative efforts to regulate
marriage and the family by East Asian jurisdictions challenge reductionist
explanations for state non-intervention in the private sphere, arguing that
state reliance on Confucian norms and values is primarily politically
motivated and serves as an excuse to not take significant action to radically
change social structures in line with international human rights obligations.
Second, even where states took legislative action to protect women from
domestic violence, such legislation manifests the prioritization of social
harmony and value placed on family unity (as influenced by Confucian
norms), thus undermining the efficacy of anti-domestic violence measures.

1. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No,
80/11 (2011).
2. See infra Part I.
3. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
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To understand the impact of Confucian social norms on the human rights
of women, this Article will examine three East Asian jurisdictions: the
People's Republic of China (PRC), Singapore,4 and Hong Kong5 . These
jurisdictionS6 have all acceded to CEDAW and have submitted extensive
state reports about the situation of women in their countries. At the same
time, the PRC, Singapore, and Hong Kong all belong to the Confucian
cultural sphere,7 and Confucianism has alternatively been used either to
bolster the legitimacy of state policies regarding the family or as
explanatory justifications for the continuation of traditional practices that
impact human rights.
The PRC and Singapore are also examined because these two states
share several important characteristics with the United States and thus
provide a unique backdrop to discuss how Lenahan can educate human
rights and legal advocacy around the state's role in the Confucian family.
The PRC, Singapore, and the United States have all committed to
preventing domestic violence in their countries in principle, either through
participation in international instruments or the adoption of domestic
legislation seeking to end violence against women. Yet all three states also
have contested relationships with the universality of human rights standards
and international scrutiny. Notably, the United States is not even a party to
CEDAW.
Part I of this Article considers the interaction of Confucianism, human
rights, and domestic violence. Part I first introduces state-articulated
challenges to the universality of human rights, articulated as "Asian" or
"Confucian" values, and considers how these so-called value systems are
translated into state practice by the Singapore, Hong Kong, and Chinese
governments. Next, before considering how the question of domestic
4. Technically in Southeast Asia, the Singaporean State casts itself as having more
in common with East Asian countries, like China, Japan, and South Korea. See, e.g.,
Bilahari Kim Hee P. S. Kausikan, An East Asian Approach to Human Rights, 2 BUFF. J.
INT'L L. 263, 269 (1995-96) (using Singapore as an example of the East Asian
approach).
5. Although Hong Kong is technically a special autonomous region of the PRC,
the PRC operates on the "one China, two systems" policy where its legislative and
legal system remains distinct and mostly autonomous. See Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic
2-4, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/5Report of States Parties: China (Addendum),

6/Add.1 (June 14, 2004) (describing general status of Hong Kong); id.
23-26
(describing judicial system of Hong Kong).
6. In discussing state practice on the international level, this Article will
necessarily focus on the state practice of the PRC and Singapore because Hong Kong is
not considered an independent member state at the United Nations.

7. See Albert H.Y. Chen, Conclusion: Comparative Reflections on Human Rights
in Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN
JURISDICTIONS, FRANCE AND THE USA 487, 495 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds.,

2006). South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam are also sometimes seen as part of this
cultural sphere.
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violence impacts the idealized family unit, the relationship between
Confucianism and the family is explored. Part II provides an overview of
domestic violence in international law and considers the participation of
Singapore and the PRC in international instruments outlining domestic
violence as a human rights violation. Part II then describes the legal
frameworks in each jurisdiction that seek to prevent domestic violence and
protect domestic violence victims.
In Part III, the Article considers lessons learned from the IACHR's
Lenahan decision and argues that East Asian legal systems must reconsider
the efficacy of their domestic violence laws and critically analyze the
impact of Confucian social norms on legislation and enforcement. First,
the Lenahan decision firmly establishes that domestic violence, and the
measures taken by the state to prevent, punish, and eliminate such violence,
should be subject to international scrutiny. Second, the Lenahan decision
reaffirms that laws alone are necessary but not sufficient, and diligent
enforcement is required; the role of police action within the anti-domestic
violence framework given particular attention. Third, the Article argues
that East Asian legal systems, like the United States, mistakenly place the
burden on victims to determine and prove domestic violence, and argues
that the meaning and interpretation of "the family" can act as a barrier to
accessing justice. State focus on harmony in the family can channel
domestic violence cases away from adjudication in the legal system into
unregulated extra-legal dispute resolution mechanisms, an outcome that
poses material risks to domestic violence victims. Part III addresses
Lenahan's lesson that the due diligence standard requires state action
against structural discrimination. The Article argues that in order to
effectively address the treatment of domestic violence as a "family and
,,8
private matter of low priority, as compared to other crimes, East Asian
states must pierce the Confucian veil and combat notions of family privacy
that obstruct transparency and accountability.
Finally, the Article concludes that Lenahan contributes to a crosscultural conversation about the utility of international law in local contexts
by challenging the mythology of the United States as a world leader in
human rights and decreasing violence against women. Lenahan also
pushes discussion about many East Asian stereotypes associated with
domestic violence relating to poverty, urbanity, and development. The
United States' response to Lenahan can likewise be educated by recent
efforts in East Asian countries to effectively implement CEDAW and
combat violence against women.

8. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11,

42 (2011).
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1. CONFUCIANISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

In 1993, Asian governments adopted the Bangkok Declarationo in
preparation for the World Conference on Human Rights, demarcating "a
distinctive Asian point of view"" on human rights. The Bangkok
Declaration adopted a cultural relativist position that challenged the
universal application of human rights standards in Asia,' 2 asserting that
human rights must be considered within the context of "national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds."' 3 Asserting that human rights should be promoted through
cooperation and consensus rather than "the imposition of incompatible
values," 4 the Bangkok Declaration also invoked state sovereignty in the
determination of human rights standards, stating that such standards were a
domestic matter.' 5 Although these same Asian governments eventually
signed on to the Vienna Program of Action reaffirming the universality of
human rights,' 6 the Bangkok Declaration sparked fierce discussions about
the application of human rights in national contexts, culminating in the socalled Asian Values model of human development.' 7
This model
emphasized economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political

9. See Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok
Declaration, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215, 216 (1995-96) (stating that "China played a
leading role in formulating this challenge"). Notably, Japan and the Philippines did not
adopt the Declaration.
10. World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1993, Report of the
Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, pmbl., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993) [hereinafter Bangkok
Declaration].
11. Joseph Chan, An Alternative View: Hong Kong, Singapore and "Asian
Values, " 8 J. DEMOCRACY 35, 35-48 (1997).
12. See Davis, supra note 9, at 216.

13. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10,

8.

14. Id. at pmbl.
15. See Davis, supra note 9, at 216.
16. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action,
1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12,
1993),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/
a.conf.157.23.en.
17. See Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, A Feminist Critique of Domestic Violence
Laws in Singapore and Malaysia 10 n.53 (Asia Research Inst., Working Paper Series
No. 6, 2003), available at http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps03 006.pdf ("Asian
values have been generally identified with three schools of thought: the Lee Kwan
Yew-Singapore model, the Mahathir-Malaysia model and the Post-TiananmenConfucianism-Nationalism model."). China's official interpretation of human rights
has invoked "Chinese values" rather than "Asian values," but the arguments in support
of contextualized interpretation of human rights remain the same. See Ann Kent,
China's Human Rights in 'the Asian Century,' in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA 187, 188
(Thomas W.D. Davis & Brian Galligan eds., 2011) (noting that the concepts were
"similar and mutually reinforcing").
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rights, which were considered second-order rights,'" and the rights of the
community over those of the individual.
Government leaders in Singapore and China have claimed a Confucian
communitarian model of society,19 arguing that the dichotomy between
"Western" human rights values and the "Asian" tradition of deference to
authority make human rights incompatible with "Confucian" societies.
Societies based on "Asian" or "Confucian" values have been characterized
as being "disciplined, group-oriented rather than atomized, and valuing
duty to the community over the assertion of rights,

...

featurling]

consensus-seeking and a deferential respect for public officials and
institutions in the interest of public harmony." 2 0 The self-conscious
adoption of this Confucian model has resulted in the elevation of the family
unit as the building block of society and the development of governmental
policies focused on the preservation of the family unit, sometimes at the
expense of individual protections.
Confucianism is deeply related to the conception and construction of the
Singaporean and Chinese states. This is most explicitly seen in the claims
made by the Singaporean government that Confucian social norms are a
fundamental part of the Singaporean identity. Although Singapore is a
multi-racial, multi-religious society, the government-authored 1991 Shared
Values White Paper asserts that Singapore's shared values include "nation
before community and society before self; family as the basic unit of
society; community support and respect for the individual; consensus, not
conflict; and racial and religious harmony."2 1 These values are also
expressed by governmental refusal to create monitoring bodies to check its
own power; instead, "[c]itizens are advised to 'trust' their governors'
integrity and righteousness as honorable men (junzi), over placing faith in
systemic checks."22 Similarly, experts note a Confucian revival in the
18. See Kent, supra note 17, at 188.
19. Proponents of "Asian Values" have referred to Confucian values to legitimate
government policy.
See Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN
Countries: "Promises to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep," 2 YALE HUM. RTs. &
DEV. L.J. 1, 19 (1999) [hereinafter Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN
Countries] (referencing the Singapore government's exposition of Confucian values);
see also Craig Williams, InternationalHuman Rights and Confucianism, 7 ASIA-PAC.
J. HUM. RTS. & L., 38, 38 (2006). It is important to bear in mind that Confucianism as
a state philosophy is not monolithic and that its long legacy opens it to many different
interpretations.
20. Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries,supra note 19, at 2.
21. Li-ann Thio, Taking Rights Seriously? Human Rights Law in Singapore, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA, supra note 7, at 158, 180 n.3.
22. Id. at 160; see also Li-ann Thio, Rule of Law Within a Non-Liberal
'Communitarian' Democracy: The Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF
RULE OF LAW 183, 194 (Randall Peerenboon ed., 2004) [hereinafter Thio, Rule of
Law] ("Moral legitimacy is asserted in speaking of a government of virtuous Confucian
junzi, superior gentlemen morally obliged to lead, enjoying popular 'trust and
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official narratives of the Chinese state, where "Confucian values of social
stability, hierarchy, and respect for authority are in official favor once

again."23
It is important to note that any discussion of "culture" or "tradition" must
necessarily consider the position of the persons interpreting and invoking
those concepts.24 Presenting the cultural values of a region or country as
distinct, monolithic, and static ignores the fluidity of cultural norm
formation and the existence of contested interpretations of such cultural
practices.2 5 Proponents of Asian/Chinese values are primarily government
officials who are using these concepts to buttress the legitimacy of certain
state policies, 26 while the contextualization of human rights, as expressed in
the Bangkok Declaration, is vigorously opposed by NGOs, civil society
actors, and academics.27 Likewise, Confucianism itself is a tradition or
philosophy that is contested 2 8 and can be interpreted to support many
respect."').
23. JOHN DoTsoN, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM'N, THE CONFUCIAN
REVIVAL IN THE PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT 5 (2011);
see also DANIEL A. BELL, CHINA'S NEW CONFUCIANISM: POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 3-18 (2008); Chen, supra note 7, at 503 ("[T]he modem

synthesis of Confucianism with socialism has initially produced a society that is
unsympathetic to the notion of the individual's rights."); Williams, supra note 19, at 38
("[F]ollowing the delegitimisation of Marxist thought, the political leaders of the
People's Republic of China have increasingly evoked visions of a Confucian Chinese
heritage to justify authoritarian tendencies.").
24. See Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in InternationalHuman
Rights Discourse, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 167, 167-75 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) (indicating that

any discussion of culture and gender must consider: (1) the status of the speaker, (2) in
whose name is the argument from culture advanced, and (3) the degree of participation
in culture formation of the social groups primarily affected by the cultural practices in
question).

25. See Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries, supra note 19, at

16 ("The presentation of 'Asian' and 'Western' cultural values as identifiable, distinct
entities obscures the existence of divergent views within a region or within a single
state itself.").
26. See id. (noting that these officials sought to justify the operation of the regimes
they represent); Yash Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, 23 H.K. L.J. 342,

343 (1993) (noting that the apparent uniformity of an "Asian perspective" on human
rights derives from international attention to the perspective of ruling elites united by
"their notion of governance and the expediency of their rule" rather than on any true
consensus).
27. More than 110 NGOs from 26 countries adopted their own Bangkok
Declaration at the regional meeting, rejecting the argument that human rights can be
conceived as an encroachment on national sovereignty and affirming the indivisibility
of human rights. See World Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 19-30, 1993, Rep. by

the Secretariat: Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/PC/83 (Apr. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Bangkok SecretariatRep.].
28. Interpretation of Confucian thought is necessarily dictated by the time period of
analysis, the specific texts being considered, and the understanding of the nature of
Confucianism (is it a religious tradition, a philosophical tradition, or a state

philosophy?). See generally Williams, supra note 19, at 47-58 (discussing evolution of
Confucian thought through different historical periods).
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-29
(opposing) positions.
Much has been written about the philosophical and political debates
around the legitimacy of "Asian Values" and their fraught relationship with
universal human rights. 3 0 Although it might appear that this debate has run
its course, relativist interpretations of human rights continue to have
salience in the international arena; both the Chinese and Singaporean
governments continue to assert the necessity of acknowledging differing
views of the role of human rights.

A. Confucianism and the Family Unit

In considering the compatibility of human rights and Confucianism,
many scholars posit that the structure of an ideal Confucian society-where
"moral duties or rights arise solely from social relationships, such as
familial relationships, friendship and political associations" 32 -iS
fundamentally incompatible to an individualistic conception of human
rights.
Society is essentially "the family writ large,"34 where "the
29. See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights in China, in HUMAN RIGHTS INASIA,

supra note 7, at 413, 422 (noting that Confucianism has been interpreted to support
both liberal and authoritarian positions, but historically Confucianism was undeniably
sexist, elitist, and inegalitarian, and failed to provide popular sovereignty or to protect
even the most fundamental civil and political liberties).
30. See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Asian Values, 9 PUB. L. REv. 168, 168
(1998); Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries, supra note 19, at 2

(noting that the Asian values challenge to the universalism human rights law was

"buoyed atop a wave of impressive economic development and growth rates").
31. For example, China considers that countries' obligations to promote and protect
human rights should be viewed in accordance with the UN Charter, international
human rights, and "in the light of their national realities" as "it is natural for countries
to have different views on the question of human rights" because of "differences in
political systems, levels of development and historical and cultural backgrounds."
U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, 4th
Sess., Feb. 2-13, 2009, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph
15(A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: China, 6, U.N. Doc.

A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1 (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/
UPR/Documents/Session4/CN/A HRC WG6 4 CHN 1 E.pdf. Likewise, while the
Singapore government respects the universality and indFiisibility of human rights, it
maintains that "[tihe manner in which all rights are attained and implemented must
nevertheless take cognizance of specific national circumstances and aspirations." U.N.
Human Rights Council, Working Grp. on the Universal Periodic Review, 11th Sess.,

May 2-13, 2011, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(A) of
the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Singapore, T 33, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/WG.6/1 1/SGP/1 (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter SingaporeResolution 5/1 National
Report].
32. See Joseph Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rightsfor Contemporary
China, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 212, 217 (Joanne R. Bauer

& Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999) [hereinafter Chan, A Confucian Perspective] (noting that
Confucian teachings are about behavior in the five basic social relationships: fatherson, husband-wife, elder brother-younger brother, ruler-ruled, and friend-friend).
33. See Randall Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights? Toward a
Theory of Rights with Chinese Characteristics,6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 40 (1993)

(arguing that, because human rights are rights to which humans are entitled from birth,
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individual exists in the context of his family[;] . . . [t]he family is part of the
extended family, and then friends and the wider society." 35 Society is thus
governed by social norms that emphasize these (familial) relationships
including filial piety, face, collectivism, and social harmony. 36
In emphasizing social harmony, value is placed on concession,
negotiation, and consensus, rather than self-assertion or conflict-inducing
competition.37 Some scholars point to the Confucian preference for nonlitigation methods of conflict resolution as an example of the expression of
this social preference for harmony, where litigation and the courts are
treated with suspicion because of the confrontational quality of such
institutions.3 8 Such societal mistrust of the legal system ostensibly
highlights the incompatibility of asserting and adjudicating individualistic
(human) rights with Confucian social norms.39 Moreover, the intrinsic
elitism of Confucianism is inconsistent with the democracy-oriented ethos
of the international human rights movement,4 0 as the paternalism of ruling
elites reduces individuals' agency and bestows rights that are qualified and
human beings must be thought of as beings "qua members of a biological species" and
not "qua social beings"-a view deeply incompatible with the Confucian one).

34. Chan, A Confucian Perspective,supra note 32, at 219.
35. Fareed Zakaria, Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,

Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 109, 113 (attributing this organizational structure to
"Eastern societies" and stating that "[t]he ruler or the government does not try to
provide for a person what the family best provides").
FOREIGN AFF.,

36. See Patricia L. Sullivan, Culture, Divorce, and Family Mediation in Hong

Kong, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 109, 110 (2005) ("The family, as the basic social and
economic unit of Chinese society, is most predominantly shaped by beliefs and values
from the social philosophy of Confucianism. The relationship rules that govern social
life and secure social stability include filial piety, the foundation stone of Chinese
society; face; collectivism; social harmony; and limited and bounded trust....
Collectivism and social harmony require that family interests and goals take priority
over those of the individual, with members expected to sacrifice their own needs and
wishes for the preservation of relationships and the social unit. Decision making is
characterized by consensus, cooperation, compromise, negotiation (sometimes with the
assistance of a family elder), and the avoidance of conflict and direct confrontation."
(citations omitted)).
37. See Chan, A Confucian Perspective, supra note 32, at 226.
38. See, e.g., Robert Perkovich, A Comparative Analysis of Community Mediation
in the United States and the People'sRepublic of China, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.

313, 314-16 (1996) (discussing the high value placed on compromise and mediation in

Confucian society because such processes allow disputants to re-establish a harmonious
relationship).

39. See, e.g., Albert H.Y. Chen, Mediation, Litigation and Justice: Confucian
Reflections in a Modern Liberal Society, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD

257, 260-61 (Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong eds., 2003) (explaining that traditional
disdain for litigation derives from the view that "the pursuit of material self-interest
that underlies civil litigation was perceived to be inconsistent with the Confucian ideal
of moral self-cultivation, character formation, and personal growth").

40. See Bangkok SecretariatRep., supra note 27, at 3 ("Democracy is a way of life.

It pervades all aspects of human life: in the home, in the local community, and beyond.
Democracy must be fostered and guaranteed in all countries.").

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013

9

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5

388

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 21:2

contingent on the reciprocal obligations and duties of citizens. 4 1
One manifestation of government paternalism and Confucian virtue in
state policy is the emphasis on the family as the instrument of governance
and through which the welfare of marginalized individuals is provided. In
the context of China, social protection laws single out "vulnerable
groups"-children, the elderly, and women-for special treatment,
protecting the disadvantaged in accordance with "Confucian notions of
benevolence'A2 while simultaneously reaffirming Confucian moral virtue
by placing duties on family members to provide for their welfare.
Similarly, the anti-welfarism of the (highly neo-liberal capitalist) cities of
Singapore and Hong Kong has led to the privatization of compassion and
charity. 3
B. The Question ofDomestic Violence
While much of the debate about the compatibility of this Confucian
worldview with human rights has focused on arguments for or against soft
authoritarianism and the squelching of civil and political dissent,4 the
ascendancy of this discourse has overlooked the Confucian state's impact
on women's rights, and domestic violence in particular. If a harmonious
society is premised on people interacting in "virtuous relationships,"'4 5
41. Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism?The Emergence of Constitutional
Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 763, 764 (2002) (noting that

conventional interpretations of the Chinese legal tradition characterize law as a means
of state control and that "[a]ny rights that do exist are granted by the state and may be
retracted"). Although the PRC legal system is not purely Confucian but reflects a
blend of Confucianism and socialism, this idea is still expressed, for example in article
51 of the PRC Constitution. XIANFA art. 51 (1982) (China) ("The exercise of citizens
of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon
the interests of the state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms
and rights of other citizens.").
42. Michael Palmer, On China's Slow Boat to Women's Rights: Revisions to the
Women's Protection Law, 2005, 11 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 151, 152 (2007) [hereinafter
Palmer, On China's Slow Boat to Women's Rights] ("The stream of protective

legislation is also very much the product of traditional paternalistic state attitudes. It is
reminiscent of the imperial Chinese legal protection-based on Confucian notions of
benevolence-extending special treatment to children, the elderly and women."
(footnotes omitted)).
43. For an interesting survey of welfare policies in Singapore, Hong Kong, and
China, see chapters on each country in EAST ASIAN WELFARE REGIMES IN TRANSITION:
FROM CONFUCIANISM TO GLOBALIZATION (Alan Walker and Chack-kie Wong eds.,
2005).
44. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN
3, 3 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995); Daniel A. Bell, The
East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflection on an East West Dialogue, 18 HuM.
RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES

RTS. Q. 641, 641 (1996); Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's AntiDemocratic Values, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 189, 189; Zakaria, supra note
35, at 109.
45. Chan, A Confucian Perspective, supra note 32, at 219 ("In this ideal
community, the highest moral virtue is jen [ren] (benevolence) when expressed in an
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where "reciprocal commitments" allow for the promotion of "shared goals
and values over one's own,'A6 domestic violence renders this ideal
irrelevant since violence disrupts the virtuous relationship and destroys any
reciprocity and shared goals. Where duties are emphasized over individual
rights, there is no prescription for individuals to remove themselves from
abusive relationships.
Violence against women is an interesting site of inquiry to consider the
interaction of Confucianism and state practice. One could argue that the
potential philosophical conflict between human rights and Confucianism is
rendered moot by state participation in the international human rights
regime. By acceding to international human rights treaties, like CEDAW
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Singapore and China
have explicitly accepted that human rights have a place in their society,
even if that space is contested.47 Moreover, the 1993 Bangkok Declaration
simultaneously insisted on a contextualized interpretation of human rights,
while reaffirming government commitment to gender equality and the
eradication of discrimination and gender-based violence against women.
Therefore, on some level, these States do not view women's rights as
contradictory to their Confucian social models.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Lenahan decision by the IACHR is the most recent decision to add
to the corpus of international instruments and treaty-body decisions that
identify domestic violence as a human rights violation and uphold the
responsibility of states to protect individuals from domestic violence.
While a full discussion about how and why domestic violence is an
international legal issue is outside the scope of this Article, 4 9 it is important
to highlight key instruments discussing domestic violence as a human
active form; 'overcoming one's selfishness' in a passive form.").
46. Id.
47. China became a state party to CEDAW on November 4, 1980 and to CRC on
March 2, 1992. Singapore acceded to both CEDAW and CRC on October 5, 1995.
CEDAW Ratification, Accessions and Successions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno
=IV-8&chapter-4&lang=en (last visited Sept. 23, 2012); CRC Ratification, Accessions
and Successions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsgno=iv-11&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited Sept.
23, 2012).
48. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 10, T 22 (reaffirming Asian governments'
commitment to "the promotion and protection of the rights of women through the
guarantee of equal participation in the political, social, economic and cultural concerns
of society, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination and of gender-based
violence against women").
COLLECTION,

49. See generally BONITA MEYERSFELD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW

1 (2010) (discussing status of norms against domestic violence in international

law).
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rights issue, especially where they relate to East Asian jurisdictions.
CEDAW is among the most widely ratified international human rights
treaties, with 187 state parties.5 0 Article 2 of CEDAW articulates the farreaching duties of state parties to prevent and eliminate discrimination
against women by all appropriate means and without delay. 5 ' Although
domestic violence was not mentioned in the text of CEDAW, General
Recommendation No. 19 of the CEDAW Committee expressly states that
discrimination includes gender-based violence and is defined as "violence
that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects
General Recommendation 19 also
women disproportionately."5 2
recognizes violence in the family53 as gender-based violence, emphasizing
that discrimination under CEDAW is not restricted to action by or on
behalf of Governments. 54 States are required to include, as part of their
CEDAW reports, (1) information about the prevalence of violence against
women and the effects of such violence on women victims; and (2)
information on the form and effectiveness of legal, preventive, and
protective measures against such violence.55 States are thus required to
take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of genderbased violence, whether by public or private act,56 and may be held
"responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for
providing compensation."5 7
In 1994, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women (DEVAW).ss DEVAW requires that states
make the justice system accessible to domestic violence survivors and
50. CEDA W Ratification, Accessions and Successions, supra note 47. At the time

of publication, the CRC, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have
193, 167, and 160 state parties, respectively. See CRC Ratification, Accessions and
Successions, supra note 47; ICCPR Ratification, Accessions and Successions, UNITED
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-4&chapter-4&lang=en (last visited Sept. 23, 2012);
ICESCR Ratification, Accessions and Successions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter-4&lang=en
&mtdsg no=IV-3&src=TREATY (last visited Sept. 23, 2012).
NATIONS

51. CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 2.

52. U.N. Comm. for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess,
General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women,

6, U.N. Doc. A/47/38

(1992).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

23.
9.
24(u)-(v).
24(a).
9.

58. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994).
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stipulates that "states should exercise 'due diligence to prevent, investigate
and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private
persons.'" 5 9 The 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing galvanized
women's rights groups, and the resultant 1995 Beijing Declaration (drafted
by governments in attendance) asserted States' determination to eliminate
and prevent all forms of violence against women and girls, 60 identified
domestic violence as a health issue for women,6 and categorized domestic
violence as gender-based violence that "violates and impairs or nullifies the
enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms."62 In
2004, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a seminal resolution
on the elimination of domestic violence against women, Resolution 58/147,
identifying it as a "human rights issue," a "societal problem," and "a
manifestation of unequal power relations between women and men."63
Resolution 58/147 also recognizes the pervasiveness and invisibility of
domestic violence," that "domestic violence can take many different
forms, including physical, psychological and sexual violence,"65 and, very
significantly, that "domestic violence is of public concern and requires
States to take serious action to protect victims and prevent domestic
violence."66 The UN General Assembly has followed up with two more
resolutions on the subject, most recently in its 2009 Resolution 63/155 .67
Resolution 63/155 recognizes the "important role of the family in
preventing and combating violence against women and girls ... [and] the
need to support its capacity to prevent and combat violence against
women[,]" 68 and clearly states that custom, tradition, and religion may not

59. MEYERSFELD, supra note 49, at 38.
60. Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action, ann. I, 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (Sept. 15,
1995).

61. Id. ann. II, T 100.
62. Id. ann. II,

224.

63. Elimination of Domestic Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 58/147, pmbl.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/5 8/147 (Feb. 19, 2004).
1(b) ("[D]omestic violence is one of the most common and least
64. See id
visible forms of violence against women and that its consequences affect many areas of

the lives of victims.").

65. Id. 1(c).
66. Id. T 1(d); see MEYERSFELD, supra note 49, at 61 (stating this recognition as
"[o]ne of the most important components of the Resolution" and highlighting its
engagement with States' responsibilities regarding due diligence to prevent,
investigate, and punish perpetrators of domestic violence, as articulated by the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women).
67. Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women,
G.A. Res. 63/155, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/155 (Jan. 30, 2009).
68. Id. 6.
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be invoked as reasons not to comply with state obligations to eliminate
violence against women.6 9
As much as these pronouncements by treaty bodies and the UN General
Assembly have identified domestic violence as a human rights issue,
whether these instruments create a legally binding obligation remains
contested. This is seen by the United States' position in Lenahan. General
recommendations made by the CEDAW committee are not automatically
binding on state parties,70 while the authority of UN Resolutions may be
limited, especially where they were adopted without a vote.7 1
A. Domestic Violence Legislation in China,Hong Kong, and Singapore
As noted above, Singapore and the PRC are state parties to CEDAW,
72
All three
thereby making CEDAW also applicable to Hong Kong.
jurisdiction made reservations to article 29(1) of CEDAW (subjecting
states to International Court of Justice processes) and neither the PRC nor
Singapore have signed or ratified the Optional Protocol to CEDAW (which
allows the CEDAW Committee oversight over individual complaints).
1. Singapore
Of these three jurisdictions, Singapore acceded to the CEDAW with the
widest ranging reservations-aside from reservations related to equality in
employment and citizenship rights.
Singapore reserved the right not to
apply the provisions of articles 2 and 16 where compliance would be
contrary to religious and personal laws.74 The categorical rejection of
69. Id. T 9.
70. See MEYERSFELD, supra note 49, at 36-37 ("General recommendations made
by UN treaty bodies are not automatically binding on states, not even to the states party
to the treaty in question. They are used to explain or interpret provisions within the
governing

treaty. . . . Even though there

is sufficient content in General

Recommendation 19 to argue that states are obliged to investigate, prosecute and
punish domestic violence, and pay compensation if they fail to do so (the obligation in
respect of other human rights violations), there is no express statement to this effect.").
71. All resolutions mentioned above were adopted without a vote.
72. Upon Hong Kong's return to the PRC, the PRC government informed the UN
Secretary-General that the reservation made by China to article 29(1) would also apply
to Hong Kong. See CEDA W Ratification, Accessions and Successions, supra note 47,

at n. 14 ("Upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong, China notified

the Secretary-General that the Convention with the reservation made by China will also

apply to the Hong Kong special Administrative Region.").
73. Singapore previously justified gender-inegalitarian citizenship laws because of
patriarchical assumptions "in line with our Asian tradition where husbands are the
eads of households." Thio, Taking Rights Seriously?, supra note 21, at 161 (quoting
Singapore's CEDAW Initial Report at paragraph 10.2). Singapore withdrew this
reservation on July 24, 2007.
74. In June 2011, Singapore modified its reservations to articles 2 and 16, which
now reads: "In the context of Singapore's multi-racial and multi-religious society and
the need to respect the freedom of minorities to practice their religious and personal
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States' responsibilities under article 2 (dealing with state responsibilities
under CEDAW) and article 16 (regarding equality in marriage and the
family) is of great concern because articles 2 and 16 can be considered
fundamental to CEDAW 75 and reservations to their effect and state failure
to implement the provisions can be considered to be contrary to the object
and purpose of CEDAW.76
The CEDAW committee has expressed concern about "the persistence of
patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and
responsibilities of women and men within the [Singaporean] family and
society at large," as these stereotypes "present a significant obstacle to the
implementation of the Convention" and "are a root cause of violence
against women in the private and public spheres."7 7
Nevertheless,
Singapore's State reports to the CEDAW Committee and to the Human
Rights Council clearly indicate its understanding and acceptance that
domestic violence is gender-based violence and considered discrimination
against women under human rights law.78
Singapore does not have a specific law regarding domestic violence,
partly due to government perception that such matters are considered
primarily a family matter and to the role of the legal system as "geared
toward the preservation of the family unit." 79 Efforts to legislate are
intrusions into the private sphere, but "it is important for the entire
community to support the formation and strengthening of families," 80

laws, the Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to apply the provisions of articles
2 and 16 where compliance with these provisions would be contrary to their religious
or personal laws." CEDA W Declarations & Reservations: Singapore, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno
=IV-8&chapter-4&lang=en#74 (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
75. The CEDAW Committee has stated that it considered articles 2 and 16 to be
"core provisions of the Convention." Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Rep. on Its 18th & 19th Sess., 6, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.I (May 14,
1998), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports/18report.pdf.
76. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signatories and state
parties to treaties may not undertake any action that is contrary to the object and
purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/conventions/i1I 1969.pdf. This impermissibility principle is adopted in article
28(2) of the CEDAW Convention.
77. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 49th Sess.,

July 11-29, 2011, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
U.N.
Doc.
21,
Women:
Singapore,
Against
Discrimination

CEDAW/C/SGP/CO/4/Rev.1 (Jan. 16, 2012).
78. See Singapore Resolution 5/1 National Report, supra note 31, T 73.
79. Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Women's Rights, International Norms, and
Domestic Violence: Asian Perspectives, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 683, 686-88 (2005) (noting

that there is simultaneously a conception of the family as private, and thus best left
ignored by the law, and as public, and thus a matter for societal concern).
80. Id. at 688 (emphasis omitted).
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presumably through mechanisms outside the legal and penal system.
Instead, domestic violence protections are incorporated into the Women's
Charter of Singapore, which permits individuals to seek protection orders
where they have been victims or are likely to be victims of family
violence. 82 Family violence is defined as "(a) willfully or knowingly
placing, or attempting to place, a family member in fear of hurt; (b) causing
hurt to a family member by such act which is known or ought to have been
known would result in hurt; (c) wrongfully confining or restraining a
family member against his will; or (d) causing continual harassment with
intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause anguish to a family
member, but does not include any force lawfully used in self-defense, or by
Family
way of correction towards a child below 21 years of age."8
members under the statute include spouses or former spouses, children,
parents and parents-in-law, siblings, and other relatives.8 4
A proposed Family Violence Bill, which sought to give the police
mandatory powers to arrest an abusive husband or spouse, was rejected due
to state interest in avoiding entering the private realm of the home." Thus,
the burden is on the domestic violence victim to take legal action to seek
protection from violence. This is described as "a soft approach" where "the
focus is more on compulsory dialogue rather than compulsory sanction."86
2. China
Unlike Singapore, the PRC only had one reservation upon its ratification
of CEDAW. The 2004 PRC Constitution states that the State "respects and
preserves human rights"8 and prohibits the maltreatment of women. The
81. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,

Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women: Fourth
Periodic Report of States Parties: Singapore, D.1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SGP/4

(Apr. 3, 2009) (reporting that the government of Singapore emphasizes that "family
undergirds society and that closely-knit and supportive families make for a cohesive
nation" and states that its policies "are designed to promote the healthy development of
families").
82. See Women's Charter § 65(1) (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.) (permitting the
court to "make a protection order restraining the person against whom the order is
made from using family violence against the family member").
83. Id. § 64 (defining "hurt" as "bodily pain, disease or infirmity").

84. Id.
85. See Li-ann Thio, Singapore Human Rights Practice and Legal Policy: Of
Pragmatismand Principle,Rights, Rhetoric andRealism, 21 SING. ACAD. L.J. 326, 351

(2009) (arguing that "when it comes to certain harms to women, the law needs to
intervene").
8 6. Id.
87. XIANFA art. 33 (1982) (China).
88. Id. art. 49 ("Marriage, the family, and mother and child are protected by the

state. Both husband and wife have the duty to practice family planning. Parents have
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2001 PRC Marriage Law directly prohibits family violence, as well as
maltreatment or desertion of one family member by another.89 The 2005
PRC Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women (LPRIW)
prohibits "discrimination against, maltreatmento of, or cruel treatment in
any manner causing injury, even death, of women." 91 Unfortunately there
is no definition in PRC law for either discrimination against women,92 or
An
domestic/family violence, or even a definition of "family."
violence
authoritative, but non-binding, interpretation has defined domestic
as "behavior whereby a person causes certain physical or mental injuries to
his family members by beating, binding, forced restriction of personal
freedom or by other means," and adds that "[d]urative or frequent family
violence constitutes maltreatment."9 3 Legal provisions regarding divorce
also consider the existence of family violence. 9 4
Currently there is no national anti-domestic violence law, although all
provinces have local prohibitions against domestic violence. Protection
the duty to rear and educate their minor children, and children who have come of age
have the duty to support and assist their parents. Violation of the freedom of marriage
is prohibited. Maltreatment of old people, women and children is prohibited.").
89. Hunyinfa (xiuzheng) (MiA (0$IE)) [Marriage Law of the People's Republic
of China] (promulgated by Order No. 9 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress, Sept. 10, 1980, amended Apr. 28, 2001) art. 3
[hereinafter Mamage Law of the People's Republic of China] ("Marriage upon
arbitrary decision by any third party, mercenary marriage and any other acts of
interference in the freedom of marriage shall be prohibited. The exaction of money or
gifts in connection with marriage shall be prohibited. Bigamy shall be prohibited.
Anyone who has a spouse shall be prohibited to cohabit with another person of the
opposite sex. Family violence shall be prohibited. Maltreatment and desertion of one
family member by another shall be prohibited.").
90. See Interpretation No. I of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues in the
Application of Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 1 (Dec. 27, 2001)
[hereinafter
Interpretation
No.
I of Marriage
Law],
available at
http://www.cnbjlawyers.com/article/en/Family/195.htm (stating that frequent family
violence constitutes maltreatment).
91. Fundquanyibaozhangfa ( SARA*Ql
OidX9W-A) [Law on the
Protection of Rights and Interests of Women] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, amended 2005) art. 2 [hereinafter LPRIW]
("Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in all aspects of political, economic,
cultural, social and family life. Equality between men and women is a basic State
policy. The State takes the necessary measures to gradually improve the systems for
protecting the rights and interests of women, in order to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against women. The State protects the special rights and interests
enjoyed by women according to law. Discriminating against, maltreating, abandoning,
and physically abusing women are prohibited.").
92. Dai Ruijun, Promoting Domestic Implementation of CEDAW in China, INST. L.

http://www.iolaw.org.cn/global/en/showNews.asp?id=18172 (last visited Aug.
24, 2012).
93. Interpretation No. I of Marriage Law, supra note 90, art. 1.
94. Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 89, art. 32 (stating
that a divorce may be granted if "one party indulges in family violence or maltreats or
abandons family members" or in "other cases which lead to the shattering of affection
between husband and wife").
CHINA,
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orders against perpetrators of domestic violence are only available under
pilot projects in select trial courts. Even where these protection orders can
be issued, they are only available within the context of divorce
proceedings,96 thus leaving individuals who are seeking protection from
violence but not divorce without recourse. Reports indicate protection
orders are not often issued, "in part, because judges remain somewhat
hesitant to issue protection orders without a clearly defined legal
framework and interpretive guidelines." 97 Unmarried individuals also have
no access to these protection orders. Under Chinese law, "all divorce
petitions must first be mediated by a judge," and judges are required by law
"to help the couple reach a reconciliation, and even if the mediation efforts
prove futile, the judge may or may not grant a divorce." 98
Chinese law encourages women to use mediation and administrative
99
The
processes to express their grievances, rather than the courts.
Marriage Law encourages women facing domestic violence to seek
intervention from the People's Mediation Committee, whose role is to
persuade the spouse to cease the violence.100 Where the case rises to a
violation of public security regulations, victims may request that the local
10
public security bureau intervene and impose administrative sanctions. '
Wives who have suffered domestic violence may also bring private
prosecutions (M ifi, zisu) against their husbands. 02
95. Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Opportunities and Challengesfor Gender-Based

Legal Reform in China, 5 E. AsIA L. REv. 197, 271-73 (2010) ("The Applied Legal
Institute of the Supreme People's Court published a Trial Guide to Domestic Violence
Related Cases in March 2008[;] . . . alleged victims can seek an emergency restraining

order for fifteen days, or a long-term protection order for three to six months. The
court is called upon to supervise this order.

. .

. The Guideline prohibited the accused

from a 200 meters radius and prohibited the disposable [sic] of valuable property,
amongst other provisions."). By January 2012, seventy-two courts were part of the

pilot project. ABA Rule of Law Initiative, InitiativeSupports Pushfor GenderJustice

in China, AM. BAR Ass'N (Jan. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/
rule of law/where we work/asia/china/news/news chinaexamining usdomesticvi
olence legislation implementation 0112.html; Jiang Xueqing & He Dan, Domestic
Violence Casts an Ugly Shadow, CHINA DAILY (Nov.

17, 2011,

8:02 AM),

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-11/17/content_14108816.htm.
96. de Alwis, supra note 95, at 272.
97. ABA Rule of Law Initiative, supra note 95.
98. Xin He, Routinization of Divorce Law Practice in China: Institutional
Constraints' Influence on Judicial Behaviour, 23 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 83, 86

(2009).
99. Palmer, On China's Slow Boat to Women's Rights, supra note 42, at 165;

Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 89, art. 43.
100. Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 89, art. 43.
101. Id. art. 58 (allowing domestic violence victims to apply to public security
organs for administrative sanctions against the perpetrator, and bring a civil suit in a
people's court, where such acts violate public security administration regulations);
LPRIW, supra note 91, art. 58.

102. Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 89, art. 45.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss2/5

18

Chia: Piercing the Confucian Veil: Lenagan's Implications for East Asia

2012]

PIERCING THE CONFUCIAN VEIL

397

3. Hong Kong

It is interesting that China had far more declarations regarding the
application of CEDAW to Hong Kong than upon its own accession.
Noteworthy declarations include: (1) that China did not regard the
Convention as "imposing any requirement upon Hong Kong to repeal or
modify any of its existing laws and regulations, customs or practices which
provide for women to be treated more favorably than men";103 and (2) that
patrilineal inheritance and property laws for indigenous groups would
continue.' 04
Unlike Singapore and China, Hong Kong has enacted legislation specific
to domestic violence, the Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships
Violence Ordinance (DCRVO).'os The primary means of dealing with
recurring domestic violence under the DCRVO is through court-ordered
injunctions. Individuals may seek injunctions against (1) spouses and
former spouses (section 3); (2) other relatives (section 3A, covering
relationships in the immediate and extended family, whether biological,
through marriage, or through adoption);106 and (3) cohabitants and former
cohabitants (section 2, applying to same sex or opposite sex couples,
provided they live together "as a couple in an intimate relationship").10 7
Violations of the DCRVO injunctions are punishable through criminal
sanctions; under some circumstances, the judge may attach an additional
authorization for a warrantless arrest.' 08 Additionally, charges may also be
brought against the perpetrator through criminal statutes of general
applicability.
Domestic violence, or intimate partner violence in government parlance,
is treated by the Hong Kong government as an issue that requires multiagency coordination, as seen from its Working Group on Domestic
Violence Issues, which incorporates a wide-ranging group of
representatives across disciplines, including police, social services workers,
103. CEDAW Declarations & Reservations: China, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-8&chapter
=4&lang-en#14 (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).
104. Id
105. Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance, Cap. 189,
1-11, L.N. 265 of 2009 (H.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/
blispdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/2CDIB62629047F40482575EE
004AF537/$FILE/CAP_189_e-b5.pdf.
106. Id. § 3A(2)(a)-(o).
107. Id. § 2.
108. See id. § 5 (the authorization for arrest can only be attached if the court "is
satisfied that the person has caused actual bodily harm to the protected person; or it
reasonably believes that the person will likely cause actual bodily harm to the protected
person" and the injunction must either be one prohibiting a person from using violence
against another person or prohibiting a person from entering or remaining in any
premises or area).
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lawyers, educators, and hospital staff, among others. 09 The official
preferred approach to intimate partner violence"o is through case
management through social service providers,"' rather than the courts.
III. LENAHAN AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

A. The United States' Response to Petitioners' Claims in Lenahan
The United States' response to the petitioners' claims in Lenahan must
be understood within the context of its uneasy relationship with human
rights and international law, as well as domestic jurisprudence on positive
duties of the state. Although the United States has portrayed itself as a
human rights leader, having "played a central role in the
internationalization of human rights law and institutions,""l2 it has a poor
record of treaty participation, especially where human rights treaties
impose positive obligations on state parties. The U.S. Supreme Court has
long opposed the imposition of positive duties on the state to "provide
members of the general public with adequate protective services"l1l3
position most distinctively articulated in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services,1 4 and reiterated in its decision in Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales." 5
In response to the petitioner's claims at the IACHR, the United States

109. Soc. WELFARE DEP'T WORKING GRP. ON COMBATING VIOLENCE, PROCEDURAL
GUIDE FOR HANDLING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE CASES, at ii (2011),

http://www.swd.gov.hk/doc/fcw/proc guidelines/battered spouse/Acrobat%20Docume
nt%20(updated%20on%2021121 1).pdf.
110. Id
111. Id at 10-11. This case manager should generally be a social worker, and it is
this individual's job to make referrals, coordinate with other service providers, brief the
victim on rights, duties and procedures, and otherwise act as the primary contact point
for the case.
112. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SUBMITTED
TO THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW T 5 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. UPR REPORT],

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146379.pdf.
113. Ronagh

J.

A.

McQuigg, Domestic

Violence and the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights: Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, 12 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 122, 132 (2012).

114. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The Rehnquist opinion decisively asserted that "nothing
in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life,

liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors" and that the
Clause is "not a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security." Id. at 196.
115. 545 U.S. 748, 767 (2005) (holding that Jessica Gonzales (now Lenahan) did
not, under the Due Process Clause, "have a property interest in police enforcement of
the restraining order against her husband," and affirming that "the benefit that a third

party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not
trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its
'substantive' manifestations").
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argued that federal laws, like the various Violence Against Women Acts
(VAWA)," 6 and existing state laws provided adequate protection against
domestic violence.' 17 The United States also alleged that such legislation
demonstrates government recognition of the seriousness of domestic
violence and the importance of a nationwide response, as evidenced by the
billions of dollars of government money devoted to the implementation of
programs related to domestic violence." 8 While acknowledging a "moral
and political responsibility" to prevent and protect individuals in their
jurisdictions from acts of abuse by non-state actors, the United States
challenged any imposition of an affirmative legal duty to do so. 9 The
U.S. position was that "the judg[ment] of governmental action such as in
this case has been and will remain a matter of domestic law in the
fulfillment of a state's general responsibilities incident to ordered
government, rather than a matter of international human rights law to be
second-guessed by international bodies."1 2 0
B. Domestic Violence as Human Rights Violation:
Lessonsfrom Lenahan
1. Domestic Violence Is Worthy ofInternationalScrutiny
The first lesson from Lenahan is that states cannot point to the
abundance and sufficiency of existing laws alone to absolve responsibility
for a failure to protect women and girls from domestic violence. The
IACHR firmly rejected the U.S. position that international law (and
international bodies) did not have a place in determining the adequacy of
government action to eliminate discrimination against women. This is a
particularly salient issue with regards to the contested relationships
Singapore and China both have with international scrutiny and human
rights.
Singapore has made all its international obligations under CEDAW and
CRC subject to Singaporean law and the constitution,121 on the premise that
116. Referring to Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§
40000-40702, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-1955; Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub
L. No. 106-386, §§ 1001-1603, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491-1539; and Violence Against
Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-271, 120
Stat. 750.
117. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, 54 (2011).
118. Id.

119. See id. 57, 106 (citing Reply by the Government of the United States of
America to the Final Observations Regarding the Merits of the Case by the Petitioners,
p. 41).
120. Id. 57.
121. Suzannah Linton, ASEAN States, Their Reservations to Human Rights Treaties
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Singapore's domestic laws were already compatible with the international
obligations undertaken. 12 2 By construing its international obligations under
human rights treaties as being confined primarily to reporting obligations,
no real changes in domestic laws and policies have been enacted. 12 3
However, a state may not invoke its internal law to justify the nonperformance of treaty obligations, 124 and Singapore (like the U.S.) must
critically consider the efficacy of its laws.
2. Laws Alone Are Necessary but Insufficient

By holding that the U.S. government's lack of a systemic, coordinated,
and effective response to protect women and girls from domestic violence
constituted an act of discrimination on the part of the state,125 the IACHR
clearly stated that enacting legislation against domestic violence is
insufficient to protect individuals from domestic violence, and that the state
must take a proactive stance in ensuring the diligent enforcement of
protective measures. 12 6

and the ProposedASEAN Commission on Women and Children, 30 HUM. RTS.

Q. 436,

441 (2008). Singapore's reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
explicitly indicates its position that Singaporean laws "provide adequate protection" to
the rights of children, and that "accession to the convention by the Republic of
Singapore does not imply the acceptance of obligations going beyond the limits
prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore nor the acceptance of any
obligation to introduce any right beyond those prescribed." Id.
122. Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries, supra note 19, at 28.

123. One could argue that international treaty processes have motivated Singapore to
re-consider its reservations to CEDAW as it has withdrawn parts of its reservations
upon accession to the treaty. Unfortunately, such reconsideration has not resulted in
significant change, however, as Singapore continues to have reservations to CEDAW
articles relating to state duties (art. 2), equality in the family (art. 16), and employment
contexts. See CEDA WDeclarations& Reservations: Singapore, supra note 74.
124. See Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries, supra note 19, at

29. This principle is articulated in article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/11_1969.pdf. Singapore is not a party to this treaty; however, several
states objecting to Singapore's reservations upon accession to CEDAW and CRC on
this basis referred to this principle as well-established under international treaty law.
See, e.g., CEDA W Declarations& Reservations: Objections of Finland and Norway,
Nov.
21,
1996,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/pages/

ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-8&chapter-4&lang=en (last visited
Aug. 24, 2012).
125. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, T 170 ("The systemic failure of the
United States to offer a coordinated and effective response to protect Jessica Lenahan
and her daughters from domestic violence, constituted an act of discrimination, a
breach of their obligation not to discriminate, and a violation of their right to equality
before the law under Art. II of the American Declaration.").
126. Id. 163.
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a. Content of the Laws
It has been suggested that the failure of the PRC's National People's
Congress to pass the draft national Anti-Domestic Violence Law is due to
the belief that existing legal prohibitions provide adequate legal protection
to domestic violence victims.127 Although the PRC has prohibited
domestic violence under several national laws, those legal mandates are
generic prohibitions and do not provide for legally enforceable definitions
Mere legal prohibitions in this form are
of domestic violence. 128
insufficient because legislation fails to contemplate how such prohibitions
are to be enforced, in violation of the due diligence standard.129 Even when
the idea that domestic violence should be stopped gains traction within the
community, the effectiveness of anti-violence laws and systems can be
limited by a lack of awareness about enforcement mechanisms and
procedures. In 2010, the All-China Women's Federation received 51,171
complaints about spousal violence from women throughout China, while a
2010 survey indicated that about twenty-five percent of Chinese women
have, at some point in their lives, faced verbal, physical or sexual abuse
perpetrated by their spouses.130 That same year, a mere forty-eight
protection orders were issued by Chinese courts enrolled in a trial project
on restraining orders.' 3 1 The large discrepancy not only highlights the
urgent need for more resources against violence, it also shows how
divorced legal solutions and protections can be from the first point of
institutional contact by individuals affected by domestic violence.
b. Role of the Police
The Lenahan decision acknowledges the "historical response of police
officers ... to treat [domestic violence] as a family and private matter of

127. Rong Weiyi, The Appeal and Action Against Domestic Violence Outside the
Legislative Framework, WOMEN'S WATCH E-NEWSLETTER, September 2011, at 4, 7,
available at http://www.womenwatch-china.org/FckHandler.ashx?id=363 ("Members
of the Committee for Internal and Judicial Affairs under the National People's
Congress believed that since principles and regulations against domestic violence are to
some extent recognized in China's Constitution, the Marriage Law, the Law of the PRC
on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women, Criminal Law, the Law of the PRC
on Public Security Administration Punishments, criminal procedure law, civil
procedure law, and other laws as well as many local regulations, the domestic violence
situation is now equipped with enough legal reference.").
128. Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 89, art. 3; LPRIW,
supra note 91, art. 46.
129. See Jiang Xueqing & He Dan, supra note 95 (quoting a researcher as saying
that in the absence of definition for domestic violence in the PRC Marriage Law, "the
police cannot decide which behavior falls into the category of domestic violence, and
which belongs to family disputes").
130. Id.
13 1. Id.
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low priority, as compared to other crimes"1 32 in the United States, and
draws particular attention to weak incentives for police enforcement of
protection orders (even where the state law seeks mandatory arrest). 33
Law enforcement officers play an integral role in both the actual protection
of individuals from domestic violence as well as the perceptions around
domestic violence-as the Lenahan decision notes, police mistreatment of
domestic violence victims "results in a mistrust that the state structure can
really protect women and girl-children from harm, which reproduces the
social tolerance toward these acts. ,,134 Police reticence in the face of
domestic violence allegations is pervasive in many jurisdictions, and China
and Singapore are no exceptions. Chinese public security bureaus have
traditionally refrained from interfering in family disputes. Rather than
exercising legal provisions in the LPRIW that allow them to impose
penalties, the bureaus often refer domestic violence victims to local
branches of the Women's Federation.135 While the Women's Federation
does play an important role in providing counseling and services to women
domestic violence survivors, 136 funneling women to informal non-judicial
enforcement organs, like the local Women's Federation, is problematic
because it could send the message that domestic violence is a "woman"
problem or "family" problem that does not deserve state interference.
3. "The Family" as Barrierto Human Rights

The third lesson from the Lenahan decision is that concepts of "the
family" and familial relationships can sometimes act as a barrier to the
protection of human rights, particularly where cultural assumptions about
the content and meaning of family relationships affect how the police and
the legal system address and determine risk. In the tragic case of the
Gonzales children, the police and other state actors wrongly assumed that
there was no imminent danger because the children were with their
father.' 37
Thus, the assumption that the existing family/parental
132. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, T 42 (2011).
133. Id. (discussing the consistent failure of law enforcement to protect victims of
domestic violence).
134. Id. 167.

135. Yuhong Zhao, Domestic Violence in China: In Search of Legal and Social
Responses, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 211, 229-30 (2001).

136. Nation-Wide "12338" Telephone Hotline to Provide Counselling and Services
to Women Victims/Survivors of Domestic Violence, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, http://webappsO1.un.org/vawdatabase/
searchDetail.action?measureld=24516&baseHREF=country&baseHREFId=346
(last
updated July 10, 2009) (reporting the handling of more than 50,000 domestic violence
cases a year).
137. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11, 31 ("The police simply replied that
the father of the children had the right to spend time with them, even though she
DATABASE
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relationship between Simon Gonzales and his daughters is unequivocally
protective directly led to state inaction despite the existence of a protection
order. In the East Asian context, assumptions about "the family" similarly
affect how governments and societies perceive domestic violence. Even
where states have taken greater action to protect women from violence,
underlying assumptions about the ideal (Confucian) structure of society and
the family have impacted the laws and regulations that govern marriage and
divorce. State emphasis on harmony has translated into policy preferences
for the use of extra-legal methods to settle family disputes, as well as
judicial discretion in determining the possibility of, and encouraging,
reconciliation. This legal framework for marriage and divorce can impact
the ability of individuals to protect themselves from domestic violence by
increasing the barriers that they face in accessing the justice system.
a. Harmony andFamily Law
Governments of China, Hong Kong, and Singapore have all expressed a
state interest in the preservation of the family unit, manifested in an
emphasis on family harmony. The PRC's 2001 Marriage Law emphasizes
the role of family members while reinforcing (Confucian) social ethics:
article 4 states that a "husband and wife shall be loyal to each other and
respect each other; family members shall respect the old and cherish the
young, help each other, and maintain the marriage and family relationship
characterized by equality, harmony and civility.""' Even though China's
LPRIW seeks to implement China's CEDAW obligations 39 to protect
women and afford them legal rights within society, these rights are
qualified by corresponding obligations to "abide by the laws of the State,
respect social morality and perform their obligations prescribed by law." 40
The contingent nature of these rights 41 and the on-going preoccupation
with women's roles in upholding "social morality" is troubling, because it
could potentially undermine the ability of women to step outside of
traditional gender (and family) roles to seek legal redress. Likewise,
Singapore's Women's Charter incorporates a "moral foundation" to the
marital relationship, deeming it to be an "equal co-operative partnership of
repeatedly mentioned the restraining order against him and that no visitation time had
been agreed upon.").
138. Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, supra note 89, art. 4 (1980)

(amended 2001).

139. Palmer, On China'sSlow Boat to Women's Rights, supranote 42, at 172.

140. LPRIW, supra note 91, art. 5.
141.

Palmer, On China's Slow Boat to Women's Rights, supra note 42, at 157

(noting that continuing concern with social ethics is important because it not only
indicates that women's rights are contingent rather than absolute, but also because
women have particular responsibility to bear for the decline in moral standards in
China about which the party-state leadership is concerned).
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different efforts."l 42 Family law in Singapore therefore expects spouses to
behave reasonably, but refrains from intervention while the spouses remain

married. 14 3
The moral and ethical obligations implied by these constructions of the
marital relationship can affect how the legal system constructs the
definition of domestic violence. Although there are legal prohibitions
against family violence, the PRC legal system categorizes family abuse
based on severity, and only punishes the "maltreatment" of family
Maltreatment, in
members as a crime if circumstances are "flagrant."
turn, is defined as "durative" or "frequent family violence."1 4 5 The law,
therefore, ranks violent acts in the family, and differentiates between oneoff acts of violence and repeated acts, thus signaling that infrequent
physical violence does not require legal sanction. The law also equates
severity with repetition, and fails to recognize that domestic violence,
whether a single incident or not, can create imminent harm to the victim.146
Harmony ideology has also impacted the framing of domestic violence
legislation in Singapore, China, and Hong Kong. All three jurisdictions
place the burden on domestic violence victims to seek state action, and to
prove the validity of their claims. In Singapore, where personal protection
orders are available, the onus is on the domestic violence victim both to
seek the protection order in the first place, and then to undertake measures
to enforce the order. In the PRC, where family violence rises to the level
deemed worthy of criminal sanction as discussed above, state action is only
taken when a complaint is first filed by the victim.14 7 Placing such a
burden on victims creates further obstacles to the prevention of domestic

142. Leong Wai Kum, Fifty Years and More of the Women's Charter of Singapore,

SING. J. LEGAL STUD., July, 2008, at 1, 16.
143. Id. ("The family law in Singapore does regulate a spouse's conduct towards the
other but it judiciously stops short of formally intervening in their relationship where
intervention threatens at least as much harm as good. It does expect spouses to behave
reasonably, and will condemn unreasonable behavior, but this condemnation must
rightly be restrained while the spouses remain married. Sanction by law should be
deferred until one spouse chooses to initiate legal proceedings against the other .... ).
144. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 260 (1979) (amended
1997) ("Whoever maltreats a member of his family, if the circumstances are flagrant,
shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than two years, criminal
detention or public surveillance. Whoever [maltreats a member of his family] and
causes serious injury or death to the victim shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not
less than two years but not more than seven years.").
145. See Interpretation No. I of Marriage Law, supra note 90, art. I ("Behavior
whereby a person causes certain physical or mental injuries to his family member(s) by
beating, binding, forced restriction of personal freedom or by other means. Durative or
frequent family violence constitutes maltreatment.").
146. See MEYERSFELD, supra note 49, at 61 (discussing the immediacy of domestic
violence, regardless of the timing of violent incidents).
147. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 260.
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violence; as noted by the Lenahan decision, the "mistaken . .. position that
victims are themselves responsible for monitoring the preventive measures
... leaves them defenseless and in danger of becoming the victims of the
assailant's reprisals."l 4 8
b. Reconciliation, Mediation, andJudicialDiscretion
The strong state interest in family harmony also leads to legislated
preference for reconciliation, and the channeling of family disputes outside
of the legal system and the courts. Singapore family law gives judges wide
discretion in determining and encouraging reconciliation or resolution
outside of the courts. Under the Women's Charter, judges have a duty to
consider the possibility of reconciliation between individuals seeking a
divorce,14 9 and may refer parties for (mandatory) mediation should the
judge consider that the matter could be resolved harmoniously.150 Hong
Kong's Matrimonial Causes Ordinance also explicitly encourages
reconciliation in divorce cases if there is a "reasonable possibility" of it,
allowing the court to adjourn proceedings as it sees fit to enable
reconciliation.' 5' The ordinance goes further in pushing for family unity by
using prolonged presence in the marital home as an indicator of potential
Under this ordinance, in determining whether a
for reconciliation.
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with his or her spouse,
judges must disregard material incidents if the parties to the marriage have
lived with each other more than six months after the incidents.15 2 This has
a significant impact on domestic violence victims because the law
essentially penalizes a domestic violence victim if she stays with an
abusive spouse for longer than six months after an incident and because her
prolonged presence in the marital home is used as evidence that
reconciliation is possible. In the Hong Kong context, the high cost of

148. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.

80/11, T 158 (2011).

149. Women's Charter § 49 (Cap. 353, 2009 Rev. Ed. Sing.).
150. Id. § 50 ("A court ... may give consideration to the possibility of a harmonious

resolution of the matter and for this purpose may

. .

.

refer the parties for

mediation . . . .").
151. Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 179, § 15A(l) (H.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blispdf.nsf/6799165D2FEE3FA94825755E0033E532/
EF 17B3FD55EACC5D482575EE004A349 1/$FILE/CAP_179_e-b5.pdf.
152. Id. § 15A(4) ("Where the petitioner alleges that the respondent has behaved in
such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with him, but the
parties to the marriage have lived with each other for a period or periods after the date
of the occurrence of the final incident relied on by the petitioner and held by the court
to support his allegation, that fact shall be disregarded in determining, for the purposes
of section 11 A(2)(b), whether the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with
the respondent if the length of that period or of those periods together is 6 months or
less.").
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housing might force domestic violence victims to remain in the same
household as the perpetrator because they cannot afford separate
accommodations.15 3
Confucian skepticism about the utility of litigation and courts can impact
the ability of domestic violence survivors to seek redress. Mediation has
been touted by Singapore and China as a preferred means of resolving
family conflict, yet, as Palmer notes, "[t]o the extent that [the] ideal of the
harmonious family involves an emphasis on traditional authority norms
between family members, and a preference for suppressing rather than
expressing grievances within the family, the likelihood is that it will
undermine rather than promote gender equality in the domestic context."l54
In domestic violence cases, however, mediation poses significant risks.155
The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (Special Rapporteur)
has warned that mediation between domestic violence victims and
perpetrators may undermine the severity of domestic violence while
increasing risk to the victim.156 In the example of police officers acting as
mediators, the Special Rapporteur expressed concern that there would be
confusion in community perception about the role of the police in law
enforcement, and thus send the wrong message that family violence is not
serious enough to warrant criminal investigation. 5 7 Likewise, judicially
mandated mediation could similarly create confusion about the role that
legal institutions play in adjudicating harm and meting out punishment
where warranted. A focus on mediation could also affect official ability to
document instances of abuse; for instance, where police officers, in acting
as mediators, fail to question both sides of a conflict and record critical
information about violent incidents.158
153. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 113 (noting that Hong Kong lacks support
enforcement mechanisms and the majority of post-divorce families do not receive child
support or alimony even when it has been court-ordered).
154. Palmer, On China'sSlow Boat to Women's Rights, supra note 42, at 163.
155. It is necessary to differentiate between the mediation of family law cases (like
custody disputes or separation proceedings) where there is a history or risk of domestic
violence and mediation of domestic violence (i.e., mediating as to the existence of
domestic violence, or mediating to stop domestic violence). The latter can perpetuate
the idea that misunderstanding or lack of communication caused domestic violence,
and that both/all parties have responsibility for the violence (de facto blaming of the
victim) without considering the power imbalances and gender discrimination that
creates the environment within which violence against women occurs.
156. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Integration of the Human
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women: Violence
Against Women in the Family, Comm'n on Human Rights, T 34, U.N. Doc.

E/CN.4/1999/68 (Mar. 10, 1999) (by Radhika Coomaraswamy).
157. Id.
158. Jiang Xueqing & He Dan, supra note 95, at 2 ("In many cases, police officers
acted as mediators, rather than interrogating both sides and taking a clear record of
what happened.").
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Mediation in the context of domestic violence (and especially mandatory
or directed mediation) remains a highly contested issue, in part because of
concerns about power imbalances between partners,1 5 9 the impact of safety
concerns for the abused partner,' 60 and the difficulties of ensuring
appropriate procedural and substantive safeguards.161
It is therefore
particularly troubling that the push made by the Singaporean, Hong Kong,
and Chinese governments towards the mediation of family law cases has
not been accompanied by conscious efforts to screen for a history or risk of
domestic violence within these cases, thus potentially exposing domestic
violence victims to further harm.16 2 Moreover, where mediation is
undertaken at the grassroots/community level outside of the courts, such as
in the PRC where village leaders, members of the local People's Mediation
Committee or local Women's Federation officials are given threshold
responsibility for dealing with domestic violence cases,163 it is important to
note that such mediations do not take place in a neutral environment, but
rather within a community which may reflect stereotypes regarding gender
roles, the nature of families and the propriety of violence.' 64
In the PRC, the official push towards mediation16 has also affected the
159. See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100
YALE

L.J. 1545 (1991), for a critical analysis of mandatory mediatory processes that

can exacerbate existing power imbalances.
160. See, e.g., Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangersof Mediation in Domestic Violence
Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 235, 244-45 (2002) (recognizing that safety interests

may impact a victim's ability to self-advocate on an equal footing); see also Jane C.
Murphy & Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the
Challenges of Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53, 56-57 (2005) ("Victims of

domestic violence might be incapable of directly participating in mediation or even
recognizing the full extent of their harm due to the psychological scars of the battering
or by a fear that participating in the mediation might provoke the batterer to engage in
retaliatory violence dunng or after the session." (citations omitted)).
161. A full accounting of the myriad issues regarding mediation and domestic
violence is outside the scope of this Article, but there is consensus (at least among
Western scholars) that decisions about the appropriateness of mediation where there is
a history of domestic violence are critical and require a nuanced view of the processes.
See Murphy & Rubinson, supra note 160, at 54.
162. In a study about the use of family mediation as a means of resolving family
disputes in Hong Kong, 50% of women and 39% of men who used mediation service
reported a history of domestic violence. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 116.
163. See supra Part II(A)(2) for details.
164. The idea of "community" is often essentialized and "community mediation" is
often presented as an unqualified good, yet communities consist of individuals whose
relationships are marked by competing interests, alliances, and stereotypes and often
reflect social norms that allow for domestic violence to occur in the first place. See
Julie Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women's Safety: Feminist Challenges to
Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 42, 52-55

(Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002).
165. It is worth noting that the 2005 amendments to the LPRIW gave some
indication that China had moved away from viewing domestic violence as a "purely
family dispute to be dealt with by means of mediation to seeing it as an issue of
criminal justice to be dealt with by the public security organs, the procuracy and the
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treatment of domestic violence in the Chinese legal system. The February
2011 Supreme People's Court Opinion 1 6 6 promotes increased mediation
efforts in criminal cases of private prosecution (such as "serious" cases of
domestic violence)16 7 with the goal of bringing about reconciliation
between the two parties.' 68 The Opinion also stipulates that "in cases
where of civil conflicts such as love affairs, marriages, family and neighbor
disputes, unexpected crimes caused by the mistakes of victims in righteous
indignation and self-defense should be reviewed with discretion and
punished with prudent judgment," 6 9 thus carving out disputes that affect
family and community harmony as different from other disputes. In the
context of domestic violence, the fear is that judicial discretion has the
potential to excuse violence against women in the family by classifying it
as a crime of passion, or worse, to return it to the private sphere.170
4. Due Diligence Requires State Action Against StructuralDiscrimination
The IACHR's strong admonishment of the U.S. government response to
the abduction of the Gonzales children underscores that the privacy of the
family is not impermeable, and that state action is necessary to defeat
discrimination against women. As the Lenahan decision states, "[s]tate
inaction towards cases of violence against women fosters an environment
of impunity and promotes the repetition of violence 'since society sees no
evidence of willingness by the State, as the representative of the society, to
take effective action to sanction such acts."'l71 Moreover, states have a
duty to act with due diligence in addressing violence against women, which
also involves measures to prevent and respond to the discrimination that

courts in a manner that is more consistent with the PRC's international obligations
under CEDAW." Michael Palmer, Transforming Family Law in Post-Deng China:
Marriage,Divorce and Reproduction, 2007 CHINA Q. 675, 695 [hereinafter Palmer,

Transforming Family Law]. However, scholars have noted a troubling shift in official
policy away from the use of courts and litigation towards mediation processes in recent
years. See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, China's Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935,
935-36 (2011). See also Rong Weiyi, supra note 127, at 6.
166. The PRC Supreme People's Court issued "The Opinions on the Implementation
of the Criminal Policy of Combining Punishment with Leniency" on Feb. 8, 2011. See
Rong Weiyi, supra note 127, at 6.
167. See id. (discussing LPRIW giving right to undertake private prosecution to
women domestic violence victims).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 9 ("[W]hen it c6mes to detailed issues such as the compensation for
victims and the punishments for the perpetratorspeople [sic] slip back into the old ideas

that domestic violence is a family dispute and should not be interfered with .... .").

171. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11, 168 (2011) (quoting Maria da Penha, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. 56 (2001)).
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perpetuates such violence.' 72
In the context of East Asian states, family privacy is likely more of an
excuse for state inaction against gender discrimination than a commitment
to Confucian privacy principles. Although there is a tendency to point to
the privacy of the family as the reason for the Chinese and Singaporean
states not to use law and the courts to further intervene in issues of
domestic violence, state willingness to legislate in other areas of family
life, such as family planning and support of the elderly, indicate that the
sanctity of family privacy is selectively applied.173 For example, the
Singaporean and Chinese governments have sought to legislate how adult
children relate to their elderly parents.1 74 Under such legislation, parents
who are unable to support themselves have the right to be supported by
their children who have come of age.' 75 This codification of the Confucian
notion of filial piety1 76 may appear on its face to sustain the parent-child
relationship, but necessarily fails because "the use of a legal instrument
would fail to promote filial piety as a virtue, for it fosters a false motivation
for children-supporting their parents out of fear of punishment."' 7 7 What
such legislation does, however, is to protect parents' interests when the
familial relationship has broken down beyond repair. The law is thus a
blunt instrument that indicates government preference, and shows
government comfort with establishing far-reaching legislation where such

172. Id. T 126.
173. A glaring example of state legislation of family life is Chinese regulations
around family planning, which is deemed to be a "demographic problem" rather than a
matter of reproductive rights. See Palmer, Transforming Family Law, supra note 165,
at 687 (noting that article 2 of the Law on Population and Birth Planning of the
People's Republic of China (2001) "declare[d] that birth planning is a fundamental
policy of the state and re-affirms the commitment to both the quantitative and eugenics
aspects of population control"). It is clear that, where state interests lie with
interference in the family, the full weight of state machinery is employed-in Beijing,
public security organs bear responsibilities for birth planning and population policy
enforcement. Id.
174. Singapore's Maintenance of Parents Act allows elderly parents (above sixty
years) who are not able to support themselves to seek maintenance from their children.
Maintenance of Parents Act § 3 (Cap 167B, 1996 Rev. Ed. Sing.). Article 49 of the
PRC Constitution states that "children who have come of age have the duty to support
and assist their parents" and that the maltreatment of old people is prohibited. XIANFA
art. 49 (1982)

(China); see also Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN

Countries, supra note 19, at 20 & n.57 (arguing that "legally compel[ling] children to
maintain their parents seems contrary to the Confucian ethic of filial piety" and that
"the selective adoption of some Confucian values" undermines the coherence of the
Asian Values ideology).
175. Chan, A ConfucianPerspective,supra note 32, at 235.

176. Thio argues that such codification goes against Confucian norms of filial piety.

See Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries, supra note 19, at 20 n.57.

I would argue that this is an example of using the law as a blunt instrument to indicate
social or government preference.
177. Chan, A ConfucianPerspective, supra note 32, at 236.
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legislation promotes state interests.178
Outside such direct legislation, states have provided incentives for its
citizens to support their family members. For example, the Hong Kong
government grants tax exemptions for children who live with or support
their parents and siblings,17 9 while the Singapore government provides
increased incentives for married children to live near, and presumably take
care of, their elderly parents. 80 Inheritance laws, likewise, express
traditional Confucian notions of familial relationships, putting parents on
equal (or possibly lower) footing than the spouse.'18 The contrast between
active legislation on these family law issues and that of domestic violence
raises the question of whether domestic violence is a matter of lower
priority because it is pigeonholed as a "women's" issue.
CONCLUSION: DOMESTICATING INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Lenahan case, and the recent IACHR decision, has already
contributed greatly to cross-cultural conversation about the utility of
First, Lenahan undercuts the
international law in local contexts.
mythology 8 2 of the United States as a world leader in human rights and
decreasing violence against women, and has forced the U.S. government to
explain on-going human rights violations against victims of domestic
violence within its borders. It has also highlighted how the reluctance of
various branches of the U.S. government to accept or impose positive
duties on state actors to protect individuals from the violent acts of other
individuals' 83 is increasingly out of step with developing international
norms. The U.S. government response to the Lenahan decision should
attempt to close this gap between U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence and
178. In this case, legislating support for elderly parents supports the anti-welfarism
policies of the Singaporean and Hong Kong governments.
179. Chan, A ConfucianPerspective,supra note 32, at 235.
180. HDB Tweaks Rules to Protect Serious Buyers, Will Launch 4,640 Flats in May,

(Mar.
28,
2012,
11:25
AM),
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1 191710/1/.html
(regarding launch of public housing schemes that give priority allocation of public
housing to married children who live with their parents (Married Child Priority
Scheme), or near their parents (the Multi-Generation Priority Scheme)).
CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM

181. See Lusina Ho, Traditional Confucian Values and Western Legal Frameworks:
The Law of Succession, in CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD 288, 310 (Daniel

A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong eds., 2003). Article 10 of the Inheritance Law lists parents,
spouses, and children as heirs of first priority, and presumptive distribution is equal
amongst them. See Law of Succession of the People's Republic of China, art. 10
(1985).
182. The idea of the mythology of the United States "as a human rights leader and
role model" is drawn from Stacey Sobel, The Mythology of a Human Rights Leader:
How the United States Has Failed Sexual Minorities at Home and Abroad, 21 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 197, 197 (2008).
183. See supra Part III.A.
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international human rights law developments.
Current controversies in the United States surrounding the
reauthorization of VAWA underscore the vulnerability of domestic
violence protections in the United States to partisan politics.'s In this way,
the U.S. response to Lenahan could be educated by recent efforts in East
Asian countries to effectively combat violence against women, for
example, through conscious efforts to extend protections to married and
unmarried couples, including same-sex cohabitating couples. 85 Discourse
about localizing international law should include finding ways to reduce
the contingent nature of the human rights of women and domestic violence
survivors, and could help frame efforts to increase and secure long-term
domestic violence protections in the United States.
Lenahan also undercuts many stereotypes associated with domestic
violence in East Asia relating to poverty, urbanity, and development, thus
underscoring the truly global nature of domestic violence and gender
By explicitly framing domestic violence as gender
discrimination.
discrimination, the Lenahan decision invokes a central tenet of
Thus, in
international law-the principle of non-discrimination.
conceptualizing effective responses to domestic violence, states must
interrogate existing legislation for hidden assumptions in legislative
policies that perpetuate structural discrimination, and which impede the
ability of individuals affected by domestic violence from seeking and
securing protection.
As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has affirmed, "[h]uman rights
are universal, but their experience is local. This is why we are committed
to holding everyone to the same standard, including ourselves."' 8 6 The
Lenahan decision offers advocates and policy-makers an opportunity to
reflect upon the content of international standards, and to consider how
those standards can be meaningfully effectuated in communities and
families. Legislation and government policies that replicate norms of
184. At the time of this writing, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of
Representatives have passed drastically different versions of bills seeking to
reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. See Robert Pear, House Vote
Sets Up Battle on Domestic Violence Bill, N.Y. TIMES (May 16. 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/us/politics/house-passes-domestic-violencebill.html. The current Senate bill seeks to expand services and protections to
underserved populations, including LGBT individuals, American Indians, and illegal
immigrants. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1925,
112th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, Nov. 30, 2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112sl925is/pdf/BILLS-112sl925is.pdf.
185. This is the case under Hong Kong's inclusive ordinance against intimate
partner violence.
186. U.S. UPR Report, supra note 112, T 5 (quoting Hillary Rodham Clinton,
Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Preface to 2009 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices (Mar. 11, 2010)).
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family privacy and gender stereotypes that reinforce structural
discrimination must be actively confronted so that lasting protections
against domestic violence can be achieved.
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